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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that T h e Supreme Court
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law," and Utah Code
section 78-2-2(3)(c), which provides that the Court has appellate jurisdiction over
"discipline of lawyers."

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that an attorney
disciplined pursuant to Utah's reciprocal discipline rule can receive a sanction no
greater than that imposed in the jurisdiction in which the first sanction was
imposed. The applicable standard of review is a correctness standard. See In re
Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue was preserved in the District Court
by legal memorandum and the oral argument of counsel. (Brief in Support of
Discipline, R. 56-65; Transcript, R. 104 at 6)
Issue 2:

Whether the District Court erred in imposing upon the

respondent the sanction of suspension rather than the sanction of disbarment for
his professional misconduct in California. The applicable standard of review is a
correctness standard. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue
was preserved in the District Court by legal memorandum and the oral argument
of counsel. (R. Brief in Support of Discipline, R. 56-65; Transcript, R. 104 at 37)
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 22. Reciprocal discipline. Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
(a) Duty to notify OPC counsel of discipline. Upon being publicly
disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having
disciplinary jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall within
thirty (30) days inform the OPC of the discipline. Upon notification from any
source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been
publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body
having disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the
disciplinary order.
(b) Notice served upon lawyer. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an
order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in this state has been
publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, of a regulatory body
having disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall forthwith issue a notice
directed to the lawyer containing:
(b)(1) a copy of the order from the other court, jurisdiction or
regulatory body; and
(b)(2) a notice giving the lawyer the right to inform OPC counsel,
within thirty (30) days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer
predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (d), that the imposition
of the equivalent discipline in this state would be unwarranted, and stating
the reasons for that claim.
(c) Effect of stay of discipline in other jurisdiction. In the event the
discipline imposed in the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body has been
stayed, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this state shall be deferred until the
stay expires.
(d) Discipline to be imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty (30) days from
service of the notice pursuant to paragraph (b), the district court shall take such
action as may be appropriate to cause the equivalent discipline to be imposed in
this jurisdiction, unless it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which
the discipline is predicated that:
(d)(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be
heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;
(d)(2) the imposition of equivalent discipline would result in grave
injustice; or
(d)(3) the misconduct warrants substantially different discipline in
this state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction.
If the district court determines that any of these elements exist, it shall
enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the respondent
to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent discipline is not appropriate.
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(e) Conclusiveness of adjudication in other jurisdictions.
provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a final adjudication of the
jurisdiction or regulatory body that a respondent has been guilty of
shall establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a
proceeding in this state.

Except as
other court,
misconduct
disciplinary

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline proceeding.
Course of the Proceedings: The Supreme Court of California imposed
discipline against H. Delbert Welker on January 4, 2002, predicated upon a
Stipulation re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition and Order Approving
Actual Suspension ("Stipulation") entered by Welker and the State Bar Court of
the State Bar of California ("California State Bar Court"). (California Order, R. 6;
Stipulation, R. 8-31) The OPC filed a Petition for Reciprocal Discipline in the
Third Judicial District Court on September 16, 2002 seeking reciprocal discipline
against Welker for the same misconduct. (Petition, R. 1-36)
Disposition in the District Court:

On April 22, 2003, Utah's Third

Judicial District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an
Order of Reciprocal Discipline. (Findings and Conclusions, R. 88-94; Order, 9597) This appeal ensued. (Notice of Appeal, R. 98-99)
Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review:
The following facts, incorporated by reference into the District Court's
findings (Findings and Conclusions, R. 89), are derived from the Stipulation re
Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition and Order Approving Actual
Suspension and the Attachment thereto.

(Stipulation, R. 8-31; Stipulation

Attachment, R. 14-21) Welker and counsel for the California State Bar signed
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the Stipulation, and it was approved by a judge of the California State Bar Court,
which recommended discipline to the Supreme Court of California. (Stipulation,
R.28)
The Baugh Matter (Stipulation Attachment; R. 16-18)
Gregory Baugh retained Welker on a contingency basis to represent
Baugh in a third-party personal injury claim arising from a vehicle accident while
Baugh was driving a truck for his employer.

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 14)

Welker knew that Baugh had separate counsel, John W. Johanson, to represent
him in a Workers' Compensation claim against his employer.

(Stipulation

Attachment, R. 14)
Welker filed a complaint on Baugh's behalf but did not conduct discovery,
nor did he arrange for Baugh to have a qualified medical examination.
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 14) Johanson had arranged for psychological and
physical examinations of Baugh, but before these were performed, Welker
allowed mediation to proceed. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 14)
The workers1 compensation carrier for Baugh's employer intervened in the
action to recover from the defendant the benefits the carrier had paid Baugh.
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 14)

During mediation, counsel for the workers'

compensation carrier asked Welker to get Johanson's permission to enter into a
global settlement by having Johanson execute a third-party compromise and
release. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 14-15)
Welker, Johanson, the counsel for the workers' compensation carrier, and
the defendant's counsel purportedly settled the case as part of a global
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settlement of Baugh's claims arising from the accident. (Stipulation Attachment,
R. 15)

But Baugh refused the global settlement, despite Welker's repeated

attempts to persuade him to accept. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 15)
Although Baugh had not accepted the settlement, Welker signed a request
for dismissal of the case prepared by the defendant's counsel. (Stipulation
Attachment, R. 15) Welker received a settlement draft from the defendant's
counsel and repeatedly attempted to convince Baugh to sign the release and
accept the draft. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 15)
The defendant's counsel filed requests for dismissal with prejudice,
including dismissal of the complaint in intervention filed by the workers'
compensation carrier. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 16)

Neither Baugh nor

Johanson had signed a release, but the dismissal was entered.
Attachment, R. 16)

(Stipulation

As its share of the settlement, the workers' compensation

carrier received the lien amount disputed by Baugh. (Stipulation Attachment, R.
16)
Later, Welker sent Baugh an advance copy of a motion for attorney's fees
and costs, and for permission to endorse the settlement draft.

(Stipulation

Attachment, R. 16) Baugh told Welker to withdraw the request for dismissal that
Baugh had not authorized, to return the settlement draft, and to withdraw from
the case. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 16)
Instead, Welker filed the motion for attorney's fees and costs, and to be
allowed to endorse the settlement drafts.

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 16)

In

support of the motion, Welker declared under penalty of perjury that the
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mediation session had resulted in a settlement. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 16)
Baugh retained substitute counsel, and the court denied Welker's motion to
permit him to endorse the drafts, but it also denied a motion from Baugh to
vacate the dismissals. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 16)
Welker eventually "endorsed, or caused to be endorsed, Baugh's name on
the settlement drafted and deposited it into his trust account."

(Stipulation

Attachment, R. 16) He mailed Baugh a trust account check with a letter stating
that it was Baugh's share of the settlement. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 17)
The court issued an order of contempt against Welker, ordering him to pay
a fine and serve five days in jail; it also issued a bench warrant with a $25,000
bond, stayed until the following September. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 17)
Baugh died in October 2000.

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 17) The day

Baugh died, the court ordered Welker to return "all monies . . . for the purported
and disputed settlement in this m a t t e r . . . to the Insurance Carrier or Carriers
who issued the instrument or instruments forthwith." (Stipulation Attachment, R.
17)
The Stipulation Attachment's conclusions of law concerning the Baugh
matter were as follows:
By failing to conduct any formal discovery, arrange for a
qualified medical examination of Baugh, and allowing mediation to
proceed before the psychological and physical examinations
arranged by his client's Workers' Compensation attorney had taken
place, Respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services with
competence in wil[l]ful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of
Professional Conduct.
By signing the request for dismissal and allowing defense
counsel to file it, Respondent corruptly and without authority
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appeared as attorney for Baugh in wil[l]ful violation of Business &
Professions Code section 6104.
By filing a declaration under penalty of perjury with a court
which misrepresented the basis for a motion as a client's
repudiation of an authorized settlement, as opposed to the attorney
entering into a purported settlement without authority to do so from
his client, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption in wil[l]ful violation of Business &
Professions Code section 6106.
By stating in his declaration to the court, made under penalty
of perjury, that a settlement had been achieved through mediation,
Respondent sought to mislead the judge by making false
statements of fact and law because no settlement in fact occurred
because settlement requires some form of client consent thereto.
Respondent wil[l]fully violated Business & Professions Code
section 6068(d).
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 17)
The Fox Matter (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18-19)
Wayne Fox retained Welker on a contingency basis to represent him in a
personal injury claim.

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 18)

Welker signed an

acknowledgment of lien by one of Fox's medical service providers. (Stipulation
Attachment, R. 18) Beginning in April 1997, the provider regularly requested
payment from Welker. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18)
That August, Welker settled Fox's claim and received a $25,000 insurance
draft payable to Welker and Fox.

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 18)

Welker

deposited it in his trust account. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18) Fox approved
disbursement, allocating portions for attorney's fees and for medical service
providers with the remainder going to himself. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18) In
September 1997, the balance of Welker's trust account dropped below what
Welker owed Fox's medical service providers. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18) By
late January 1998, the balance was negative. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Welker did not pay the medical service provider until April 27, 2000 - more than
one year after Fox had filed a California Bar complaint against Welker, and after
Welker had been contacted by the California State Bar. (Stipulation Attachment,
R. 18)
The Stipulation Attachment's conclusions as to the Fox matter were as
follows:
By not paying Fox's funds held in the client trust account to the
medical service providers as requested by Fox, Respondent failed
to pay client funds as requested by his client in wil[l]ful violation of
rule 4-100(B)(4).
By not maintaining at least $5,738.00 received on behalf of Fox in
the client trust account until payment to the medical service
providers, Respondent failed to maintain client funds in trust in
wil[l]ful violation of rule 4-100(A).
1

By misappropriating at least $5,738.00 of Fox's funds, respondent
committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption
in wil[l]ful violation of Business & Professions Code section 6106.
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 19)
The Commingling Matter (Stipulation Attachment, R. 19)
Between February and October 1997, Welker wrote numerous trust
account checks for things that were not client-related; he "routinely" issued such
checks "to family members, clothing and other stores, restaurants, utilities, and
travel agencies." (Stipulation Attachment, R. 19)

The Stipulation Attachment

concluded that "By writing personal checks on his client trust account,

1

The Stipulation Attachment further concluded that "Respondent with gross
negligence misappropriated Fox's funds in wil[l]ful violation of rule 4-100(B)(4)."
(Stipulation Attachment; R. 19) The California State Bar Court's Modifications to
Stipulated Facts, Conclusions of Law and Discipline deleted this provision. (R.
29)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent commingled funds in wil[l]ful violation of rule 4-100(A)." (Stipulation
Attachment, R. 19)
The Matter of Discipline Imposed By Another Jurisdiction
Attachment, R. 19)

(Stipulation

Welker was suspended from the practice of law in Utah on January 29,
2001}

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 19) The Stipulation Attachment concluded

that "the professional misconduct of which Respondent was found culpable in
Utah warrants discipline in the State of California." (Stipulation Attachment, R.
20)
The Matter of Welker's Failure to Report Imposition of Discipline By
Another Jurisdiction (Stipulation Attachment, R. 20)
Welker failed to report to the California State Bar that he had been
disciplined in Utah; the California State Bar discovered this information by
contacting the Utah State Bar. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 20) The Stipulation
Attachment concluded that "By failing to report to the State Bar in writing within
30 days of the time he had knowledge of the imposition of discipline against him
[by] the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and the Utah State Bar, Respondent wil[l]fully violated Business and Professions
Code section 6068(o)(6)." (Stipulation Attachment, R. 20)
Aggravating Circumstances
The Stipulation identified several aggravating circumstances. These were:
trust violations, significant harm to the public or the administration of justice, and

2

The Third Judicial District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order of Suspension in this prior matter are at R. 22-27, attached to the
Stipulation. The suspension was for thirty days.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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multiple acts of misconduct.3 (Stipulation, R. 9)

The Stipulation Attachment

identified the "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances."

(Stipulation

Attachment, R. 20-21)
The facts supporting the aggravating circumstance of "Trust Violations"
were Welker's misappropriation of Fox's settlement proceeds, which were
subject to a lien, and "the repeated and routine payment of personal expenses
from a client trust account." (Stipulation Attachment, R. 20) Likewise, Welker's
failure to maintain a client trust account in Utah was a trust violation. (Stipulation
Attachment, R. 20)
The facts supporting the aggravating circumstance of multiple acts of
misconduct were multiple trust account violations in California and Utah.
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 20)
The facts supporting the aggravating circumstance of "harm," were
Welker's acceptance without client authorization of a settlement that was not
acceptable to the client, with the delays in setting aside the dismissal being such
that the client died without knowing his case had been reactivated.

(Stipulation

Attachment, R. 20) Because of this, "it is reasonable to assume that the value of
the cause of action has been diminished, to the detriment of his widow."
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 20-21)

3

Although the Stipulation also identified "pattern of misconduct" as an
aggravating circumstance, the State Bar Court's Modifications to Stipulated
Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition state that "while there is clear and
convincing evidence of multiple acts of misconduct, the facts do not support a
pattern of misconduct." (R. 29)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mitigating Circumstances
The Stipulation identified a single mitigating factor: Welker had no prior
record of discipline. (Stipulation, R. 10)
The Discipline Imposed on Welker By the Supreme Court of California
The Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, disciplined Welker on
January 4, 2002, by suspending him from the practice of law for three years.
(California Order, R. 6)

The suspension was stayed and Welker placed on

probation for four years on condition that he be actually suspended for eighteen
months. (California Order, R. 6)
The Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings in Utah
Based upon Welker's discipline in California, the OPC filed a Petition for
Reciprocal Discipline in September 2002. (Petition, R. 1-36) The District Court
heard the matter on March 14, 2002. (Findings and Conclusions, R. 88)
The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law incorporated
by reference the findings and conclusions from the Stipulation.

(Findings and

Conclusions, R. 89) The relevant portions are set forth verbatim here:
Baugh[:] Welker failed to conduct formal discovery or arrange for
a qualified medical exam in person injury/workers' compensation
litigation, and allowed mediation to proceed before medical
information was available. Welker signed a request for dismissal
and allowed defense counsel to file it without authority. Welker
misrepresented the client's authorization to settle a claim in a sworn
declaration filed with a court. Welker sought to mislead the court as
to the client's authorizing a settlement.
Fox[:] Welker failed to pay medical service provider liens as
directed by his client, the funds for which having been deposited in
his client trust account for this purpose. Welker's client trust
account was overdrawn as to the amount to be paid the medical
service providers. Welker misappropriated the client's funds.
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Trust Account[:]
Welker wrote checks out of his client trust
account for items not client related including personal and family
expenses.
Reciprocal discipline^] A January 29, 2001 order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah suspended Welker
from the practice of law in the state of Utah, for conduct warranting
discipline in the state of California. Welker did not report this
discipline to the State Bar of California.
(Findings and Conclusions, R. 90)
The District Court correctly concluded that the order of the California
Supreme Court "is a final adjudication that Welker is guilty of professional
misconduct and conclusively establishes the misconduct for purposes of this
proceeding."

(Findings and Conclusions, R. 92)

The court also correctly

concluded that it must impose "discipline equivalent to that imposed in California
unless one of three exceptions stated in Rule 22(d)(1), (2), or (3) clearly appear
upon the face of the record of the California Proceedings."

(Findings and

Conclusions, R. 92-93)
The District Court also concluded that "[a] finding that an exception to
equivalent discipline provided in Rule 22(d)(1), (2) or (3) is appropriate can by the
terms of the exception benefit only the Respondent." (Findings and Conclusions,
R. 93) The OPC contends that this conclusion is in error.
Finally, the District Court concluded that equivalent discipline would be
appropriate, and credited Welker with six of the eighteen months of actual
suspension imposed in California. (Findings and Conclusions; R. 93) The Order
of Reciprocal Discipline suspended Welker for one year.

(Order of Reciprocal

Discipline, R. 95-96) The OPC contends that this, too, is error.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court incorrectly concluded that in reciprocal discipline
proceedings, any departure from discipline equivalent to that which was imposed
by the original disciplining jurisdiction can only be less harsh. The District Court's
interpretation goes against the plain language of the reciprocal discipline rule and
eviscerates the OPC's role in reciprocal discipline cases. Moreover, it permits
inconsistent results for similar misconduct, thereby impeding the objective of
substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters.

Welker's misconduct

warrants disbarment in Utah, and fairness requires that this be imposed rather
than the year-long suspension ordered by the District Court.
ARUGMENT
I.

The District Court Incorrectly Concluded That the Degree of
Reciprocal Discipline Imposed in Utah Can Only Be the Same or Less
Than the Degree of Discipline Originally Imposed in the Other
Jurisdiction
The District Court concluded that the reciprocal discipline rule permits a

downward departure from the degree of discipline imposed, but that it neither
contemplates nor permits a possible increase in the level of discipline. (Findings
and Conclusions, R. 93; Transcript, R. 104:37) This is incorrect.
A.

The Rule Plainly Allows Departure from the Equivalent
Discipline, and Does Not Limit the Departure to Discipline Less
Severe

The reciprocal discipline rule is found among the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD").

See Rule 22, RLDD.

For purposes of

disciplinary proceedings in Utah, "a final adjudication of the other court.. . that a
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respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the
misconduct." Rule 22(e), RLDD.
The rule provides that "equivalent discipline shall be imposed" unless the
record in the other jurisdiction's case plainly shows (1) that the respondent was
deprived of due process; (2) "the imposition of equivalent discipline would result
in grave injustice;" or (3) "the misconduct established warrants substantially
different discipline in this state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction."
22(d), RLDD.

Rule

This subsection further provides that "If the district court

determines that any of these elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it
deems appropriate.

The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that the

imposition of equivalent discipline is not appropriate." |d.
The District Court interpreted this portion of the subsection incorrectly,
concluding that although it has the authority to lessen the severity of the
sanction, it cannot increase the sanction even if the application of Utah's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and recent case law
interpreting the Standards would result in a more severe sanction in Utah had the
disciplinary case been brought here first. (R. 93) In other words, the upper limit
of possible sanctions is set by what was imposed in the original disciplinary
jurisdiction, regardless of what is imposed in Utah for the same misconduct.
This runs contrary to a plain reading of the rule.

Equivalent discipline

must be imposed with few exceptions, but one of those exceptions is when the
respondent's misconduct "warrants substantially different discipline" in Utah. The
word "different" simply means "unlike."

The phrase "different discipline"
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encompasses discipline of either greater or lesser severity; it is not limited to one
or the other.
B.

The OPC's Reading of the Rule Makes Sense In the Context of
the RLDD and the Standards as a Dynamic Whole

The RLDD require the OPC to "perform all prosecutorial functions." Rule
4(b), RLDD.

This includes the duty to "[s]eek reciprocal discipline where

appropriate when informed of any disbarment or suspension or public discipline
imposed by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having
disciplinary jurisdiction." id. at 4(b)(9). Significantly, the rule does not say "seek
identical or lesser reciprocal discipline." See id. The procedures for seeking
reciprocal discipline are set forth elsewhere in the RLDD. See Rule 22, RLDD.
The reciprocal discipline rule provides that upon notification that a Utahlicensed attorney has been disciplined elsewhere, the OPC shall obtain a copy of
the disciplinary order. See Rule 22(a). Thereafter, "OPC counsel shall forthwith
issue a notice to the lawyer. . .." id. at 22(b). The notice gives the attorney "the
right to inform OPC counsel . . . of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the
grounds set forth in paragraph (d), that the imposition of the equivalent discipline
in this state would be unwarranted and stating the reasons for that claim." Id. at
22(b)(2).
The rule articulates no explicit direction concerning the procedure for
moving the case forward. That it is the OPC's duty to do so is set forth as
described in Rule 4; that the forum for doing so is the District Court is implicit in
Rule 22, which provides that with some exceptions, "[u]pon the expiration of 30
days from service of the notice [upon the attorney], the district court shall take
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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such action as may be appropriate to cause the equivalent discipline to be
imposed in this jurisdiction

" Rule 22(d), RLDD.

There is no procedure for seeking separate Utah discipline of a Utahlicensed attorney who has been disciplined in another state. In other words, the
OPC cannot initiate an independent investigation and proceeding based upon the
same facts, present it to a Screening Panel, and file a formal complaint in District
Court.

Instead, it brings a reciprocal discipline action in which "a final

adjudication of the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body that a respondent
has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the misconduct for
purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state." Rule 22(e), RLDD. This is
consistent with the RLDD's statement that "These rules shall be construed so as
to achieve substantial justness and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch
and at the least expense to all concerned parties." Rule 1(c), RLDD.
Although the respondent and the O P C are limited to the other court's
adjudication of the misconduct except for purposes of establishing one of the
exceptions identified in subsection (d), neither side is limited to the sanction
imposed in the other court.

This is why the rule provides that equivalent

discipline shall be imposed "unless it clearly appears upon the face of the record
from which the discipline is predicated that: . . . the misconduct established
warrants substantially different discipline in the state or is not misconduct in this
jurisdiction." Rule 22(d)(3). Put another way, although judicial determinations of
misconduct are given conclusive effect, the District Court may independently
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evaluate the facts and determine the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken in
Utah.
Although the District Court makes its determination

concerning what

discipline to impose based upon "the face of the record," if it determines that "any
of these elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate."
Rule 22(d) and (e), RLDD.

The court is thus free to depart from strictly

equivalent discipline.
Grounds for discipline include a lawyer "bep'ng] publicly disciplined in
another jurisdiction." Rule 9(c), RLDD. The RLDD further provide that imposition
of sanctions is governed by the Standards. See Rule 12, RLDD. They do not
provide that for purposes of reciprocal discipline, the imposition of sanctions is
governed or limited by the sanction imposed in the other jurisdiction.
Turning to the Standards, "[reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court,
another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction."
2.10, Standards.

Rule

The rule does not limit reciprocal discipline to equivalent or

lesser discipline; instead, it encompasses identical discipline or discipline
imposed upon the basis of the foreign discipline but with a different sanction—
either more or less severe. See id.
Limiting reciprocal discipline to the same or less severe sanction imposed
in the other jurisdiction would result in manifest unfairness to respondents
disciplined in Utah for similar conduct Indeed, the Standards were designed to
promote "consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or
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similar offenses within and among jurisdictions." Rule 1.3, Standards. Permitting
the District Court to depart from the equivalent sanction only to reduce the
degree of sanction is tantamount to saying that a lawyer can avoid the sanction
ordinarily imposed on his or her colleagues for identical misconduct so long as
the lawyer is disciplined elsewhere first. This is unfair, and inconsistent with
construction of the RLDD "so as to achieve substantial justice and fairness in
disciplinary matters with dispatch and at the least expense to all concerned
parties." Rule 1(c), RLDD.
Moreover, the OPC's prosecutorial role would be rendered meaningless in
reciprocal discipline cases if it could not offer its perspective and guidance to the
District Court concerning whether the lawyer's misconduct "warrants substantially
different discipline in Utah or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction." Rule 22(d)(3).
If that were the drafters' or this Court's intent, the OPC's role would have been
expressly limited.
C.

Other Jurisdictions Interpret Their Reciprocal Discipline Rules
to Permit an Increase in Discipline

Courts in other jurisdictions interpreting reciprocal discipline rules have
concluded that courts may increase the sanction imposed in the first jurisdiction if
a more severe sanction is warranted in the second jurisdiction. Although other
examples will be noted later, this Brief focuses on the District of Columbia
because it is a jurisdiction where reciprocal discipline is imposed more frequently
than in any other. See In re Zdravkovich, 2003 D.C. LEXIS 548 at 7 (Sept. 11,
2003) (reciprocal discipline cases are significant percentage of disciplinary
actions in the District of Columbia; the total number "dwarfs" the number in other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jurisdictions).

Accordingly, the body of case law interpreting the District of

Columbia's reciprocal discipline rules is well developed and may be of some use
here notwithstanding that the disciplinary structure and the applicable rules differ
in the respects noted herein. In the District of Columbia, disciplinary cases are
conducted by the Board on Professional Responsibility, which makes findings
and conclusions and recommendations of discipline to the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia. Participants in the proceedings are the respondent and
the Office of Bar Counsel.
The predecessor of the current reciprocal discipline rule provided that the
Board on Professional Responsibility could recommend to the Court of Appeals
that reciprocal discipline should be imposed, or that it wished to pursue the
matter de novo.4 See In re Reid. 540 A.2d 754, 757 (D.C. 1988) (interpreting
D.C. Bar R. XI, section 18). If the Board recommended reciprocal discipline, the
court was required to impose identical discipline unless "Bar Counsel or the
attorney demonstrates, or the Court finds upon the face of the record upon which
the discipline is predicated, that clearly: . . .[t]he imposition of the same discipline
by the Court would result in grave injustice; o r . . . [t]he misconduct established
warrants substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction . . . ." jd. The District
of Columbia rule governing the conclusiveness of adjudication in the jurisdiction
where discipline was originally imposed is similar to that of Utah's rule. Id.
The rule was revised in 1989, however. See In re Drurv, 638 A.2d 60, 6263 (D.C. 1994).

The revised rule continues to permit the Board to elect to

proceed de novo, but provides that identical discipline must be imposed "unless
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the attorney demonstrates, or the Court finds on the face of the record, by clear
and convincing evidence, that one or more grounds set forth in subsection (b)
[sic] exists."

Id.

Significantly, the role of Bar Counsel, which was explicitly

identified in the prior rule, has now been eliminated.

Nevertheless, the court

noted that:
We do not think, however, that this precludes Bar Counsel from
playing any part in the resolution of reciprocal discipline matters.
The general powers and duties of Bar Counsel encompasses the
investigation and prosecution of all matters involving attorney
misconduct complaints. . . . Both the Board and this Court are
entitled to hear the views of Bar Counsel in carrying out their
respective functions in all aspects of the operation of the
disciplinary system.
Id. at 63. Moreover, a more recent case noted, "While the plain language of [the
reciprocal discipline rule] places the burden on the disciplined attorney to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser sanction is warranted,
the Office of Bar Counsel also has standing to object to the imposition of identical
discipline . . . and may recommend a different sanction when it believes an
exception applies." In re Zdravkovich. 2003 D.C. LEXIS 548 at 8-9 (Sept. 11,
2003).
Further, the Board on Professional Responsibility can recommend, and
the Court of Appeals can impose, a sanction that is either more harsh or less
severe. ]d. at 62 (rejecting the respondent's contention that the respondent is the
only person who can challenge the imposition of identical discipline); see also Jin
re Gardner, 650 A.2d 693, 696 (D.C. 1994); In re Berqer, 737 A.2d 1033, 10391040 (D.C. Ct. App. 1999).

4

Thus, an attorney suspended in New York was

As noted above, Utah's reciprocal discipline rule does not provide this option.
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disbarred in the District of Columbia for misappropriation of client funds because
"[l]n virtually all cases of intentional or reckless misappropriation, disbarment is
the appropriate sanction." See In re Ladas, 798 A.2d 1067, 1068 (D.C. 2002).
Colorado offers similar examples, although its structure also differs from
Utah's, and pursuant to its reciprocal discipline rule, the regulatory body must
give the respondent notice of any claim that substantially different discipline is
warranted, and with notice, it may present additional evidence. See acj. People
v. Apker, 2003 Colo. Disc. LEXIS 24 (Colo. Apr. 7, 2003) (respondent suspended
for six months in Arizona for trust fund violations and theft; Colorado disbarred
him, noting that "[t]he knowing conversion of client property almost invariably
results in disbarment under Colorado law."); People v. Costa, 56 P.3d 130 (Colo.
2002) (respondent was publicly reprimanded in New Mexico for making material
misrepresentation to the court, but disbarred in Colorado for the same conduct).
D.

The Reciprocal Discipline Rule Allocating the Burden to the
Respondent Is Not Relevant to the Analysis of Whether a
District Court May Impose a Sanction Greater Than What Was
Imposed in the Other Jurisdiction

Equivalent reciprocal discipline is not appropriate when "the procedure [in
the other jurisdiction] was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process." This must "clearly appear[ ] upon the
face of the record from which the discipline was imposed." Rule 22(d)(1), RLDD.
Likewise, reciprocal discipline is not appropriate when "the imposition of
equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice" but this, too, must "clearly
appear[ ] upon the face of the record." Rule 22(d)(2), RLDD. Finally, reciprocal
discipline is not appropriate when it "clearly appears upon the face of the record"
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that "the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this
state or is no misconduct in this jurisdiction." Rule 22(d)(3), RLDD.
The reciprocal discipline rule specifies that "[t]he burden is on the
respondent to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent discipline is not
appropriate." Rule 22(d), RLDD. This is not a burden of proof as to the facts—
those having been established by the original disciplinary proceeding—but it is a
burden of persuasion as to the application of Utah's Standards to Utah's Rules of
Professional Conduct.
The District Court concluded that this language, coupled with the absence
of corresponding language assigning a burden to the OPC, signifies that the
reciprocal discipline rule does not permit an increase in the level of sanction.
(Transcript, R. 104: 38) This is incorrect because the OPC's burden5 is already
assigned elsewhere in the RLDD, and apply to all "proceedings seeking
discipline or transfer to disability status." Rule 17(c), RLDD. The OPC's global
burden of proof is only shifted to the respondent where explicitly assigned in the
RLDD. See Rule 17(c), RLDD (shifting the burden to the respondent in seeking
reversals

of

screening

panel

recommendations,

and

in

reinstatement,

readmission, or transfers from disability status); Rule 10(c), RLDD (burden is on
respondent in challenging reversal of screening panel recommendation); Rule 25
(burden

is

on

respondent

to

demonstrate

criteria

for

readmission

5

or

Ordinarily, the burden of proof is on the OPC "in proceedings seeking discipline
. . . . " Rule 17(c), RLDD. Obviously, a reciprocal discipline proceeding is such a
proceeding, but inasmuch as the misconduct is "establish[edj conclusively," its
usual burden is relieved as to establishing the facts. It nevertheless has a
burden of persuasion in all disciplinary matters.
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reinstatement). The mere absence of an assignment of burden to the OPC in the
reciprocal discipline rule signifies only that it must meet its usual burden of
persuasion when it comes to demonstrating the appropriate sanction.
II.

Weiker's Misconduct in California Warrants Substantially Different
Discipline in Utah, and the Appropriate Discipline In Utah Is
Disbarment
In determining whether "the misconduct warrants substantially different

discipline," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals conducts a two-step inquiry:
first, whether the misconduct would not have resulted in the same sanction as it
did in the originally disciplining jurisdiction, and second, whether the difference is
substantial. See Berqer, 737 at 1040. This is a useful analysis here.
Weiker's misconduct included filing in court under penalty of perjury a
declaration that made a material misrepresentation concerning the basis for a
motion. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 17) In California, this was termed "an act
involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption." (Stipulation Attachment, R.
17) Welker thereby "sought to mislead the judge by making false statements of
fact and law." (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18) Weiker's actions were in "wil[l]ful"
violation of the applicable rules. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 17-18) The District
Court's Findings and Conclusions paralleled these stipulated findings and
conclusions. (Findings and Conclusions, R. 90)
Weiker's misconduct also included failing to maintain client funds in trust,
and "misappropriating" client money. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 19) The latter
was "an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption," and was a willful
violation. (Stipulation Attachment, R. 19) Again, the District Court's Findings and
Conclusions mirrored that of the Stipulation:

Weiker's trust account was
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overdrawn as to the amount to be paid the medical service providers. "Welker
misappropriated the client's funds." (Findings and Conclusions, R. 90)
Less serious, but still noteworthy, were Welker's reckless failure to
competently perform legal services (Stipulation Attachment, R. 18; Findings and
Conclusions,

R. 90), his signing an unauthorized

request for dismissal

(Stipulation Attachment, R. 18; Findings and Conclusions, R. 90), his failure to
pay funds as requested by his client (Stipulation Attachment, R. 19; Findings and
Conclusions, R. 90), his use of his trust account for personal purposes
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 19; Findings and Conclusions, R. 90), and his failure
to report discipline in another jurisdiction in willful violation of California rules
(Stipulation Attachment, R. 20; Findings and Conclusions, R. 90)
In Utah, disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction for the types
of misconduct in which Welker engaged.

Welker sought to mislead a court.

Disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction for violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct "with the intent . . . to deceive the court."
Standards.

Rule 4.2(a),

Welker made false statements of material fact to a court under

penalty of perjury and misappropriated client money.

Disbarment is the

appropriate presumptive sanction for "engaging] in serious criminal conduct, a
necessary element of which includes . . . false swearing . . . misappropriation, or
theft . . . ." Rule 4.2(b), Standards. The same conduct also falls within the
portion of the rule providing that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive
sanction when a lawyer "engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects
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on the lawyer's fitness to practice." Rule 4.2(c), Standards. Although each of
these subsections appears to apply to Welker's misconduct, one is sufficient to
reach the presumptive sanction of disbarment. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207
(Utah 1997)
Welker's misappropriation of client money was the subject of some
dispute at the District Court. Welker contends that the misappropriation was not
intentional, but the record establishes (1) that the medical service provider to
whom he owed the money "regularly contacted" him "requesting payment"
beginning in April 1997; (2) that he deposited Fox's settlement money into his
trust account in August 1997 and disbursed some to himself, some to Fox, and
some to other medical service providers; (3) that by September 1997 (a period
during which he was writing checks for personal purposes on the trust account),
the trust account balance was less than what was owed the remaining medical
service providers; (4) that by January 1998, the trust account had a negative
balance; (5) that Fox demanded that Welker pay the medical service providers,
but he failed to do so; (6) that Fox filed a Bar complaint against Welker in March
1999; and (7) that Welker did not pay the medical service provides to whom the
money was owed until late April 2000—after the Bar contacted him. (Stipulation
Attachment, R. 19).

All of this demonstrates that Welker's conduct was more

than merely negligent, and at some point became intentional within the meaning
of Rule 4.2 of the Standards.
Utah case law applying the Standards to misconduct similar to that of
Welker's misconduct supports the conclusion that Welker's misconduct would
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have resulted in a presumption of disbarment here. See e.g. In re Babilis. 951
P.2d 207 (Utah 1997)

(disbarment is appropriate presumptive sanction for

intentional misappropriation of client funds); In re Ennenqa, 2001 UT 111 (single
instance of misappropriation warranted disbarment); In re Tanner, 960 P.2d 399
(Utah 1998) (disbarment warranted for forging power of attorney to settle case
without client's consent, keeping settlement, lying to investigator warranted
disbarment).
Moreover, taking into account the factors to consider in imposing a
sanction - the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual
injury caused by the misconduct, and the existence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances - all support a conclusion that Welker would be disbarred for his
misconduct. See Rule 3, Standards. He violated duties to the court, his clients,
and the profession. He acted willfully in violation of his responsibilities.

His

actions injured his clients, the administration of justice, and the integrity of the
profession. Finally, there were several serious aggravating circumstances, and
but a single and insubstantial mitigating factor. Disbarment was the appropriate
sanction in Utah for Welker's misconduct.
This is obviously different than the suspension Welker received in
California.

Moreover, the difference is substantial, inasmuch as suspension is

"the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period
of time," whereas disbarment "terminates the individual's status as a lawyer."
Compare Rule 2.3, Standards with Rule 2.2, Standards. The substantial nature
of these differences is further highlighted by what a respondent must do to gain
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reinstatement after a suspension, contrasted with what a respondent must do to
gain readmission after disbarment, which are identical except that a respondent
seeking readmission must pass the Bar exam—a significant undertaking even for
seasoned attorneys. See Rule 25(e)(7), RLDD.
If Welker's misconduct "warrants substantially different discipline in this
state," the District Court should enter an order imposing an "appropriate
sanction." Rule 22(d), RLDD. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction, and the
District Court erred in failing to impose it.
CONCLUSION
Welker's professional misconduct would have resulted in his disbarment in
Utah. The fact that he was suspended first in California should not insulate him
from receiving the appropriate sanction in Utah. Any other result is inherently
unfair to Utah respondents who have engaged in similar misconduct and
received the harsher penalty dictated by the Standards. The District Court erred
in its interpretation of what the reciprocal discipline rule permits, and as a
consequence failed to impose the appropriate discipline. The OPC therefore
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respectfully requests that this Court remand the case with directions to enter an
order disbarring Welker from the practice of law.
DATED: October

2^.2003.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

./

16goo_ / A • 1^ ^ V U ^
Kate A. Toomey
Deputy Counsel
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Stipulation re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition and Order Approving Actual
Suspension
Order of Reciprocal Discipline
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

]I
])

H.DelbertWelker,#3418

)

Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i

Civil No. 020909349

i

Judge Robin W. Reese

On March 14,2002 a hearing was held upon the Office of Professional Conduct's
Petition for Reciprocal Discipline under Rule 22 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability. Paul H. Proctor appeared and argued on behalf of the Office of Professional
Conduct. Respondent H. Delbert Welker appeared and argued on his own behalf.
Having read the Petition and Brief in Support of Discipline, and Respondent's
Answer to the Petition, Memorandum and Affidavit in response to the Petition and
Memorandum and Affidavit in reply to the Brief, and having heard the arguments, the
Court enters the following Findings of Fact:
1.

The O P C is an office within the Utah State Bar and is authorized to bring

this action on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Ethics and Discipline Committee. The Utah
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Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law in Utah
including the discipline of those admitted to practice law in Utah's State Courts. Utah
Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 4. The Utah Supreme Court has delegated to the OPC the
investigation and prosecution of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
2.

H. Delbert Welker is a member of the Utah State Bar, State Bar No. 3418.

According to the records of the Utah State Bar, Welker's address for purposes of
communication and notices is 8661 South Highland Drive, #179, Sandy, Salt Lake
County, Utah.

Following a period of inactive status, Welker activated his license in

August 2002. .
3.

Welker is also a member of the California State Bar, State Bar No.

156867, whose current status is suspended on discipline for three years, which period is
stayed on condition of four years probation and that he be actually suspended for 18
months from 30 days after January 4, 2002. The California Supreme Court Order, In Re
Harry Delbert Welker On Discipline, Case No. S101662, as attached and incorporated
into the Petition is incorporated into these findings.
4.

The California Supreme Court Order arises from discipline in the State Bar

Court, State Bar of California, In the Matter of Harry Delbert Welker, State Bar No.
156867, Case Nos. 99-0-12194, 99-0-12580, and 01-J-02752.

The State Bar Court

Stipulation re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition as attached and incorporated
into the Petition is incorporated into these findings.
5.

On June 24, 2002, Welker accepted service of a Notice of Reciprocal

Discipline filed and served pursuant to Rule 22(b).
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6.

The discipline imposed upon Welker by the California Supreme Court is

based upon the Facts and Conclusions of Law entered in California State Bar Court
case numbers 99-0-12194, 99-0-12580 and 01-J-02752. The facts and conclusions, as
admitted by Respondent, are summarized as follows:
a.

Baugh, Case No. 99-0-12580: Welker failed to conduct formal discovery or

arrange for a qualified medical exam in personal injury/workers' compensation litigation,
and allowed mediation to proceed before medical information was available.

Welker

signed a request for dismissal and allowed defense counsel to file it without authority.
Welker misrepresented the client's authorization to settle a claim in a sworn declaration
filed with a court. Welker sought to mislead the court as to the client's authorizing a
settlement.
b.

Fox, Case No. 99-0-12194: Welker failed to pay medical service provider

liens as directed by his client, the funds for which having been deposited in his client
trust account for this purpose. Welker's client trust account was overdrawn as to the
amount to be paid the medical service providers. Welker misappropriated the client's
funds.
c.

Trust account, Case No. 99-0-12194: Welker wrote checks out of his client

trust account for items not client related including personal and family expenses.
d.

Reciprocal discipline, Case No. 01-J-02752: A January 29, 2001 order of

the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah suspended Welker from the
practice of law in the state of Utah, for conduct warranting discipline in the state of
California. Welker did not report this discipline to the State Bar of California.
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7.

The Office of Professional Counsel contends that under Rule 22(d)(3) the

Court may impose discipline that is greater or more severe than the equivalent
discipline imposed in California as the misconduct established warrants substantially
different discipline in Utah. The Office contends that for the established misconduct,
disbarment is appropriate under the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court effective July 1, 1993, and in particular Rule 4.2 of the
Standards. The Office acknowledges that it bears the burden to demonstrate that the
imposition of discipline greater or more severe than discipline equivalent to California is
appropriate.
8.

Respondent contends that under Rule 22(d)(2) the imposition of discipline

in Utah equivalent to discipline in California will result in a grave injustice. Respondent
acknowledges that he bears the burden to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent
discipline is not appropriate. In particular, Respondent contends:
a.

He voluntarily discontinued practicing law in June 2001 and did not

practice law in either California or Utah until activating his Utah license in August 2002.
b.

He notified the Utah Bar of his California suspension in February

2002, but the Bar did not contact him respecting reciprocal discipline until June 2002.
c.

Since activating his Utah license he has represented only one

d.

He entered the mortgage business but has not generated a cash

client.

flow.

He and his family have not had an income since June 2002.

hardship from not being able to practice law has been and is severe.
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The financial

e.

The additional six-month California suspension that he understood

would not be imposed and the Utah Bar's delay in commencing a reciprocal petition has
led to his financial ruin.
9.

Respondent also contends that Rule 22(d)(3) does not allow for the

imposition of discipline greater or more severe than that ordered by the California
Supreme Court. Respondent contends that Rule 22(d) refers only to the Respondent's
burden of proof and does not explicitly refer to greater or more severe discipline. He
further contends that the phrase "substantially different in this state" appearing in the
same sentence as "not misconduct in this jurisdiction" precludes the Court from ordering
greater or more severe discipline.
Having entered Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following Conclusions of
Law:
1.

The District Court has jurisdiction over Respondent and this matter

pursuant to Rule 6(a), 11 (a) and 22 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, as
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1993 and amended January 1,
2003.
2.

Under Rule 22(e) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the

California Supreme Court Order is a final adjudication that Welker is guilty of
professional misconduct and conclusively establishes the misconduct for purposes of
this proceeding.
3.

Rule 22(d) requires the Court to impose in this jurisdiction, discipline

equivalent to that imposed in California unless one of three exceptions stated in Rule
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22(d)(1), (2) or (3) clearly appear upon the face of the record of the California
proceedings.
4.

A finding that an exception to equivalent discipline provided in Rule

22(d)(1), (2) or (3) is appropriate can by the terms of the exception benefit only the
Respondent.
5.

The burden to demonstrate the existence of one of the exceptions to

equivalent discipline is on the Respondent.
6.

Rule 22(d) intentionally omits reference to a burden upon the Office of

Professional Conduct to demonstrate that under Rule 22(d)(3) substantially different
discipline in the form of greater or more severe discipline is warranted in this state.
7.

If the Court determines that upon the face of the record from which the

discipline is predicated that either Rule 22(d)(1), (2) or (3) apply, the discipline imposed
in this state may vary from equivalent discipline only to impose a lesser penalty.
8.

Respondent has failed to demonstrate that imposition of equivalent

discipline would result in grave injustice.
9.

It is appropriate to impose in Utah discipline equivalent to the discipline

imposed by the California Supreme Court In Re Harry Delbert Welker On Discipline,
Case No. S101662 arising from the State Bar Court, State Bar of California, In the
Matter of Harry Delbert Welker, State Bar No. 156867, Case Nos. 99-0-12194; 99-012580; and 01-J-02752.
10.

For the purpose of reciprocal discipline in Utah, Respondent has served

six of the eighteen months actual suspension imposed in California between the
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February 2002 effective date of the suspension in California and the activation of his
Utah license in August 2002.
11.

For the purpose of a wind-up period, as to all but one matter, Respondent

requested two weeks to conclude his practice of law within Utah. As to one personal
injury case, an auto/pedestrian accident, wherein Respondent's client is a minor,
Respondent

requests

approximately

30

days

within

which

conservatorship for the minor to conclude a settlement of her claims.
DATED this _ 2 L ^ day of April 2003.
BYTHECOURT:

Robin W. Reese
District Judge

Approved at to form:

H. DelbertWelker"
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STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
AND ORDER APPROVING
ACTUAL SUSPENSION

Bar# / ^ C P S ' 6 ) V
A Member of the State Bar of California
(Respondent)

PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

A. Parties* Acknowledgments:
(!)

Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted C)o*h$ b < L r S

;

1 9R 1 .

(date)

(2)

The parties agree to b e bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even If conclusions of law or
disposition are rejected or c h a n g e d by the Supreme Court.

(3)

All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation, are entirely
resolved by this stipulation a n d are d e e m e d consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation and order consist of <£l pages.

[4)

A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is
included under "Facts."

[5)

Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions
of Law. M

;6)

No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any
pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.

7)

Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. C o d e §§6086.10
8c 6140.7. (Check one option only):
^BL
D

until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless
relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.
costs to b e p a i d in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years:

D
D

(hardship, special circumstances or other g o o d cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure)
costs waived in part as set forth under "Partial Waiver of Costs"
costs entirely waived
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. Aggravating Circumstances [fc .afinition, see Standards for Attorney So..^tions for Professional Misconduct,
standard 1.2(b).) Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.
)

D Prior record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]
(a)

•

State Bar Court case # of prior case

(b)

D

date prior discipline effective

(c)

•

Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:

(d)

D

degree of prior discipline

(e)

•

If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below or
under "Prior Discipline".

D

Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith; dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.

J%£

Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to
account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward
said funds or property.

yi.

Harm: Respondenfs misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.

•

Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the
consequences of his or her misconduct.

D

Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her
misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.

^

D

Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondenfs current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
No aggravating circumstances are involved.

itional aggravating circumstances:
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Mitigating Circumstances [see

t

.hdard 1.2(e).) Facts supporting mitiga,. j circumstances are required.

—-

V) ^C

N o Prior

(2)

•

No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.

(3)

D Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous cdndor and cooperation to the victims of
his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.

(4)

D Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and
recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of
his/her misconduct.

(5)

D Restitution: Respondent paid $
restitution to
, or criminal proceedings,

Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice-coupledwith present misconduct which-is not deemed serious. 5 ^ S " S H

;

on
_ _ _ _ In
without."the threat or force of disciplinary, civil

r

(6)

•

Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to
Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.

(7)

D Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.

(8)

a

(9)

D Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial
stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her
control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.

Emotionai/Physicat Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct
Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony
would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities >yere not
the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and
Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.

(10) D Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her
personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
11) D Good Character: Respondents good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the
legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
12) •

Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred
followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation,

13) •

No mitigating circumstances are involved.

dditional mitigating circumstances:
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Discipline

_

^

-

.

S<B,-

1. Stayed Suspension.
A. Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
^

i.

Vhm.o.

and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
present fitness to practice and present learning a n d ability In the law pursuant to
standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

D

ii. and until Respondent pays restitution to
[payee(s)] (or the Client Security Fund, if appropriate), in the amount of
, plus 10% per annum accruing from
_
and provides proof thereof to the Probation Unit, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel

D

iii. and until Respondent does the following:

B. The above-referenced suspension shall be stayed.
Probation.
Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period o H a o r Cn)
CH) V-J
V-tars
* effective date of the Supreme Courf ofd<
which shall commence upon the
order herein. (See rule 953,
California Rules of Court.)
3. Actual Suspension.
A, Respondent shall be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a
period of g^gydhgiin • OS) m o n ^ s
._
* • '
•

i.

and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to
standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

D

II.

and until Respondent pays restitution to
[payee(s)] (or the Client Security Fund, if appropriate), in the amount of
, plus 10% per annum accruing from
and provides proof thereof to the Probation Unit, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel

iii. and until Respondent does the following:
dditionai Conditions of Probation:
D

If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she shall remain actually suspended until
he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in •
general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

)3f During the probation period, Respondent shall comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and
Rules of Professional Conduct.
^

Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent shall report to the Membership Records Office of the
State Bar and to the Probation Unit, all changes of information, including current office address and
telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the
Business and Professions Code.

*W

Respondent shall submit written quarterly reports to the Probation Unit on each January 10, April 10,
July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, respondent shall state
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
Reuben
Clark
Law School,
BYU.
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conditions of probation v ;ng the preceding calendar quarter. It ..^e first report would cover less
than 30 days, that report shall be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended
period.
In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier
than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of
probation.
(5)

D

c

Respondent shall be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent shall promptly review the terms and
conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, respondent shall furnish to the monitor such reports as may be
requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Probation Unit. Respondent shall cooperate fully with the probation monitor.

(6) ^fc£ Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent shall answer fully, promptly and truthfully
any inquiries of the Probation Unit of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel and any probation monitor
assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to
whether Respondent Is complying or has complied with the probation conditions: Y '
(7)

J3^ Within o n e f f i y e s r of the effective date of the discipline herein, respondent shall provide to the
Probation Unit satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the
test given at the end of that session.
D

(8)

•

9) ^0^

10) •
f

No Ethics School recommended.

Respondent shall comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter
and shall so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with
the Probation Unit.
The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
•

Substance Abuse Conditions

•

Medical Conditions

•
^^

Law Office Management Conditions
Financial Conditions

Other conditions negotiated by the parties:

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent shall provide proof of passage of the
Mulfistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MMPREM), administered by the National Conference
of Bar Examiners, to the Probation Unit of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel during the period of
actual suspension or within one year, whichever period Is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results
In actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 951(b), California Rules of
Court, and rule 321 (a)(1) 8c (c), Rules of Procedure.
;•

No MPRE recommended.

0

Rule 955, California Rules of Court: Respondent shall comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (c)
of rule 955, California Rules of Court, within 30 and 40 days, respectively, from the effective date of
the Supreme Court order herein.
Conditional Rule 955, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or
more, he/she shall comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (c) of rule 955, California Rules of
Court, within 120 and 130 days, respectively, from the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein.
Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent shall b e credited for the period
of his/her interim suspension
toward the stipulated period of actual suspension.
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A Memberbf the State Bar
inancial Conditions
Respondent shall pay restitution to
[payee(s)l (or the
Client Security Fund, if appropriate), in the amount(s) of
, plus
10% interest per annum accruing from
'
, and
provide proof thereof to the Probation Unit, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel,
Q
no later than

a'
Q

X

on the payment schedule set forth on the attachment under "Financial Conditions,
Restitution.*

1. If respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly
report, respondent shall file with each required report a certificate from respondent and/or a
certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Probation Unit, certifying
that:
a.

respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State
of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is
designated as a Trust Account*' or "Clients' Funds Account";

b.

respondent has kept and maintained the following:
. i. a written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are hetd that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement, made on behalf of
such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii, a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (Hi), above, and if there are any
differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the
reasons for the differences.

c.

respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients
that specifies:
i. e a c h Item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distrtoution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.

2. If respondent does not possess any client funds, property or isecurities during the entire period
covered by a report, respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with
the Probation Unit for that reporting period. In this circumstance, respondent need not file
the accountant's certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.

/

Within un» (1) yuuLUf the effective date of the discipline herein, respondent shall supply to the Probation Unit satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting
School, within Digitized
the same
period
passage
of theClark
testLaw
given
at BYU.
the end of that session.
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ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

Hany Delbert Welker

CASE NUMBER(S):

99-0-12194; 99-O-12580; Ol-J-02752

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
99-O-12580
[Baugh Complaint]
On April 9, 1997, Gregory Baugh ("Baugh") hired Respondent on a
contingency basis to represent him in pursuing a third-party personal injury claim
arising out of a vehicle accident which occurred on May 7, 1996, while Baugh was
driving a truck for his employer. At or soon after the time Baugh hired
Respondent, Respondentwas aware that Baugh was pursuing a Workers'
Compensation claim against his employer through another counsel, John W.
Johanson (*Johanson "*)."
On or about Aprii 30, 1997, Respondent filed the complaint in Gregory
Baugh v. Theodore J, Balesteri Santa Clara County Superior Court, case number
CV 765847 ("Baugh v. Balesteri").
At no time did Respondent conduct any formal discovery or arrange for a
qualified medical examination of Baugh. Respondent allowed mediation to
proceed before psychological and physical examinations arranged by Johanson had
taken place.
On or about December 10, 1997, Zenith Insurance Company ("Zenith"), the
Workers' Compensation carrier for Baugh's employer, filed a complaint in
intervention in Baugh v. Balesteri in order to recover from Balesteri the benefits
paid Baugh.
On or about February 10, 1999, a mediation session was held in Baugh v.

_JZ
Page #
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Balesteri. By letter dated February 10, 1999, Norm Beegun ("Beegun"), counsel
for Zenith requested that Respondent obtain Johanson's permission to enter into
a global settlement by having Johanson execute a third party compromise and
release ("release"). Otherwise, according to Beegun's letter, Zenith would claim
a credit in the Workers' Compensation case.
Thereafter Respondent, Paul Yee ("Yee"), counsel for Balesteri's insurance
company, and Beegun, purported to settle Baugh v. Balesteri for $85,000 as part
of a global settlement of ^augh's claims arising from the vehicle accident.
However, Baughrefiis^d frTaccept the global settlement offered by Yee.
By letter dated February 17, 1999, Respondent urged Baugh to accept the
global settlement.
By letter dated March 1, 1999, Respondent advised Yee that he did not
have Johanson's permission to enter into a global settlement.
In mid-March 1999, in response to a letter from Respondent dated March
16, 1999, Johanson telephoned Respondent and reiterated and confirmed that
Baugh did not agree to the purported settlement.
By letter dated March 29, 1999, Respondent sent Baugh the release and
asked him to return it signed. Respondent further stated that he would not
receive the settlement draft from Yee until he had the signed release back from
Baugh.
Respondent sent Baugh two letters dated April 6, 1999. In one letter
Respondent set forth his analysis of the advantages of Baugh accepting the global
settlement. With the other letter Respondent enclosed another copy of the
release and advised Baugh that upon receipt of the signed release Respondent
would send him his share of the settlement. Also on April 6, 1999, without having
gained Baugh's acceptance of the settlement offer, Respondent signed a request
for dismissal of Baugh v. Balesteri prepared by .Yee.
On April 10, 1999, Respondent received the settlement draft from Yee.
Thereafter on numerous occasions Respondent attempted to convince Baugh to
sign the release and, ultimately, the settlement draft.
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On April 26, 1999, Yee filed the requests for dismissal with prejudice of
Baugh v. Balesteri. including Zenith's complaint in intervention. The request for
dismissal was signed by counsel for Zenith on April 8, 1999. No release was
signed by Baugh or Johanson. The dismissal was entered on April 26, 1999. As
its share of the settlement, Zenith received the lien amount disputed by Baugh
from Yee.
On September 9, 1999, Baugh received from Respondent an advance copy of
a motion for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $28,615.00, and for
permission to endorse settlement drafts in Baugh v. Balesteri. By letter dated
September 15, 1999, Baugh directed Respondent to withdraw the unauthorized
request for dismissal, return the settlement draft, and withdraw from the case.
On September 17, 1999, Baugh filed a complaint with the State Bar alleging
that Respondent failed to represent him competently and had entered into a
settlement which Baugh had not authorized. On September 28, 1999, a State Bar
investigator mailed Respondent a letter regarding Baugh's complaint and
requesting Respondent's response.
On September 30, 1999, Respondent filed a motion for attorney's fees, and
costs and to be permitted to endorse settlement drafts in Baugh v. Baleisteri. In
support of the motion Respondent declared under penalty of perjury that a
settlement had been achieved at the mediation session.
On November 15, 1999, Baugh substituted Thomas Casazza ("Casazza") for
Respondent as his attorney of record in Baugh v. Balesteri.
On March 2, 2000, Respondent's motion to permit him to endorse Baugh's
name to settlement drafts received from Yee was denied. Thereafter Respondent
filed a motion for an attorney's fee lien against Baugh's settlement. On March 21,
2000, this motion was denied.
*
On April 4, 2000, Baugh's motion to vacate the dismissal of Baugh v.
Balesteri/ filed by Casazza, was denied.
^

On April 21, 2000, Respondent endorsed, or caused to be endorsed, Baugh's
name on the settlement draft and deposited it into his Wells Fargo client trust

±
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account, account number 1221011911074 0047 220892 ("client trust account").
On May 26, 2000, Respondent mailed Baugh client trust account check number
1074, in the amount of $27,385 with a letter explaining that it represented
Baugh's share of the settlement in Baugh v. Balesteri.
On August 15, 20§0, an order re contempt was issued against Respondent
in connection with Baugh v. Balesteri. The court ordered that Respondent pay a
$1,000 fine,, serve five days in jail, and issued a bench warrant with a $25,000
bond, stayed until September 22, 2000.
On October 17, 2000, Baugh died.
By order filed dctober 17, 2000, the court ordered that Respondent return
"all monies . . . for the purported and disputed settlement in this matter . . : to
the Insurance Carrier or Carriers who issued the instrument or instruments
forthwith." and provide proof thereof. On October 18, 2000, Respondent declared
under penalty of perjury that he had sent Yee a trust account check in the
amount of $56;000.
By failing to conduct any formal discovery, arrange for a qualified medical
examination of Baugh, and allowing mediation to proceed before the psychological
and physicalexaminations arranged by his client's Workers'Compensation
attorney had taken place, Respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services
with competence in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
By signing the request for dismissal and allowing defense counsel to file it,
Respondent corruptly and without authority appeared as attorney for Baugh in
wilful violation of Business 8B Professions Code section 6104.

i
/ .n

~"/^
By filing a declaration under penalty of perjury with a court which
0 ,)( 1 \
misrepresented the basis for a motion as a client's repudiation of an authorized
^sD
settlement, as opposed to the attorney entering into a purported settlement
without authority to do so from his client, Respondent committed an act involving
moral turpitude/dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation of Business 8B
Professions Code section 6106.
By stating in his declaration to the court, made under penalty of perjury,

10
Page #
'
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that a settlement had been achieved through mediation, Respondent sought to
mislead the judge by making false statements of fact and law because no
settlement in fact occurred because settlement requires some form of client
consent thereto. Respondent wilfully violated Business 85 Professions Code
section 6068(d).
99-Q-12194
[Fox Complaint]
In January 1997 Wayne Fox ("Fox") hired Respondent on a contingency
basis to represent him in pursuing a personal injury claim. Respondent signed an
acknowledgment of lien by a medical service provider who had provided services to
Fox* Beginning in April 1997,^ one of FoxVmedical service providers, M
Schultz, regularly contacted Respondent by telephone requesting payment.
On August 13, 1997, Respondent settled Fox's personal injury claim and
received an insurance draft from USAA Insurance Company payable to Fox and
Respondent in the amount of $25,000.00. On August 14, 1997, Respondent
deposited the draft into his client trust account. •
Thereafter, Fox approved a disbursement of the $25,000.00 settlement
*u£ p
<*•>•
which authorized Respondent to take $8,325 as his fees, to
T^LM§f^§j£^^}^
medical service providers, andj&jaaaUfce-x^^^
to Ep^._On75ugust
22, 1997, R e s p o n d e n t ^
642, pai4^1l>lB2Ml
P\{
to Fox._On September 17, 1997, the balance of Respondent's client trust account A"""^ % V f *>
dropped to $5,375 - less than Respondent owed Fox's medical service providers.
\£ \
M
,-vN<

On January 28, 1998, the balance in the client trust account was a
negative $85.10.

\, r

\

hi"

1

No payment having been made by Respondent to Fritter and Schultz, they
contacted Fox, who demanded that Respondent pay Fritter and Schultz. When
Respondent failed to do so, Fox filed a complaint with the State Bar on March 5,
Ai
1999. Respondent'did not pay any of Fox's funds held in Respondent's client trust
l
account to the medical service providers as requested by Fox until April 27, 2000,
. \f
after contact by the State Bar, when Respondent paid Fritter and Schultz the sum
'\ f r
y

of $5,700.38.

,\^J,

l
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By not paying Fox's funds held in the client trust account to the medical
service providers as requested by Fox, Respondent failed to pay client funds as
requested by his client in wilful violation of rule 4-100(B)(4).
By not maintaining at least $5,738.00 received on behalf of Fox in the client
trust account until .payment to the medical service providers, Respondent failed to
maintain client funds in trust in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A).
Respondent with gross negligence misappropriated Fox's funds in wilful
violation of rule 4-100(B)(4).
"~~~
. c:
. By misappropriatingat least $5,738.00 of Fox's funds, Respondent
^f^
committed an act involving inoral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in wilful
violation of Biusiness & Professions Code section 6106.

99-Q-12194
[Commingling]
Between February 10, 1997, and October 28, 1997, Respondent wrote
numerous checks out of his client trust account for items which were not clientrelated. Respondent routinely issued checks from his client trust account to
family members, clothing and other stores, restaurants, utilities, and travel
agencies.
By writing personal checks on his client trust account, Respondent
commingled funds in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A).
Ol-J-02752
(Discipline Imposed by Another Jurisdiction)
By order filed January 29, 2001, the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, suspended Respondent from the practice of law
in the State of Utah based on a Stipulation for Discipline By Consent entered into
between Respondent and the Utah State Bar. A certified copy of said order is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Respondent was found culpable of professional
misconduct in a proceeding in another jurisdiction as provided in California
Business and Professions Code section 6049.1.

\t
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As matters of law: 1) the professional misconduct of which Respondent was
found culpable in Utah warrants discipline in the State of California; and 2)
Respondent was not deprived of any constitutional protection during the Utah
proceedings.
Ol-J-02752
(Failure to Report Imposition of Discipline by Another Jurisdiction)
Respondent did not report to the State Bar of California that he had been
disciplined by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and the Utah State Bar. Rather, the State Bar of California contacted
the Utah State Bar and determined that Respondent had been disciplined..
By failing to report to the State Bar in writing within 30 days of the time he
had knowledge of the imposition of discipline against him the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the Utah State Bar,
Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6068(o)(6).

FACTS SUPPORTINGAGGRAVATING CIRCITMSTANCES
Trust Violations
The misappropriation of Fox's settlement proceeds, which were subject to a "
medical service provider lien, and the repeated and routine payment of personal
expenses from a client trust account, as set forth above in "Facts and Conclusions
of Law," were trust violations. Respondent's failure to maintain a client trust
account in Utah was a trust violation in that jurisdiction.
Multiple Acts/Pattern of Misconduct
The trust account violations in California and Utah were multiple and
similar, establishing a pattern of misconduct
Harm
Respondent accepted, without Baugh's authorization, a settlement which
was unacceptable to Baugh. Because of Respondent's two motions to allow him to
endorse the settlement check, subsequent's counsel's attempts to set aside the
dismissal were so delayed that Baugh died without knowing that his cause of
action had been reactivated. Because Baugh died before Baugh v. Balesteri was
legitimately settled or tried, it is reasonable to assume that the value of the

13
Page #
Attachment Page 7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cause of action has been diminished, to the detriment of his widow.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to on page one, paragraph A.(6), was July 30, 2001.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed
Respondent that as of July 30, 2001, the estimated prosecution costs in this
matter are approximately $2,595.30. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is
an estimate only and that it does not include State Bar Court costs which,will be
included ini aiiyfiri^
that
should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted,
the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

Charles A. Gruber #7391
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
801-531-9110

Third Judicial District

JAN 2 9 2001
Deputy ClerK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER OF SUSPENSION

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
H. Delbert Welker, #3418
Respondent

Civil No. 000902065
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers filed in this matter including
the Complaint, the Stipulation for Discipline By Consent signed by the parties, the
Affidavit of the Respondent, H. Delbert Welker and otherwise being fully advised in the
premises the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and
order of suspension:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Mr. Welker represented Ms. Rosa Lee Crowley and Ms. Lindsey Welker in
personal injury matters in Utah.
2. Mr. Welker signed a written "Medical Reports and Doctor's Lien" ("medical
provider lien") with a chiropractic clinic for medical services provided to Ms. Crowley a
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Ms. Welker in both Ms. Crowley and Ms. Welker's personal injury matters.

Both Ms.

Crowley and Ms. Welker signed the medical liens.
3. Pursuant to the written medical provider liens Mr. Welker was directed by Ms.
Crowley and Ms. Welker "to pay directly" to the chiropractic clinic "such sums as may be
due and owing" for "medical service rendered" to Ms. Crowley and Ms. Welker and "to
withhold such sums from any settlement, judgement or verdict as may be necessary to
adequately protect said clinic".
4. In addition to Ms. Crowley and Ms. Welker's personal injury matters and
medical provider liens, Mr. Welker also represented a Phetnkhonsy Bouapha. There
also was a medical provider lien with the chiropractic clinic for medical services
provided to Ms. Bouapha, and the terms of that medical lien were essentially the same
as the medical provider lien in Ms. Crowley's and Ms. Welker's personal injury matters.
5. For approximately six months in 1996 (approximately February 1996 through
June 1996) Mr. Welker did not have a trust account in Utah for the purpose of holding
client and third party funds as required by Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Prior to that time he did have a trust account in Utah.
6. In early 1996, Mr. Welker moved his law practice to California, but kept his
family and his residence in Salt Lake County, Utah. In or around 1996, Mr. Welker did
set up a trust account In California.
7. In early to mid-1996, Mr. Welker was able to settle the personal injury matters
in Ms. Crowley's, Ms. Welker's and Ms. Bouapha's personal injury matters.
8. Mr. Welker distributed the settlement funds in Ms. Crowley's, Ms. Welker's
and Ms. Bouapha's personal injury matters by paying himself attorney's fees
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contingency percentage basis and by distributing to his clients their portion of the
settlement funds.
9. When Mr. Welker distributed the settlement funds to himself and to Ms.
Crowley, Ms. Welker, and Ms. Bouapha, Mr. Welker did not promptly pay the amount
owed to the chiropractic clinic for medical services provided to his clients.
10. When Mr. Welker settled these personal injury matters and distributed the
settlement funds to himself, and to his clients, Mr. Welker did not promptly notify or
account to the chiropractic clinic regarding the funds he was holding for the chiropractic
clinic pursuant to the medical provider lien.
11. Mr. Welker did not keep the complete records of his trust account concerning
the settlement funds for Ms. Crowley, Ms. Welker, and Ms. Bouapha regarding the
settlement of their personal injury rhatters for the required time period of five years after
the termination of the representation of these clients.
12. On or about October 15,1996, the chiropractic clinic began sending letters to
Mr. Welker demanding that he pay the funds owed to the chiropractic clinic by Ms.
Crowley, Ms. Welker, and Ms. Bouapha and which were to be paid to the chiropractic
clinic pursuant to the medical provider lien at the time the settlement funds were
distributed.
13. On October 23, 1996, Mr. Welker wrote to the chiropractic clinic and stated
that it "never has been my intention to not take care of the obligations on the cases that
we had together" and stated that he would "take care of the problem".
14. Mr. Welker suggested in his October 23, 1996, letter that Ms. Welker's
expenses could be covered by health insurance.
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15; On October 29,1996, the chiropractic clinic wrote to Mr. Welker and gave an
accounting of the money owed to the clinic for medical services provided in the Crowley,
Welker and Bouapha matters.
16. The amount claimed by the chiropractic clinic was not disputed by Mr. Welker.
17. The amount claimed by the chiropractic clinic was not disputed by Mr.
Welker's clients.
18. On or about April 7, 1997, the chiropractic clinic wrote to Mr. Welker and
again demanded payment for the services provided by the chiropractic clinic in the
Crowley, Welker and Bouapha matters.
19. On or about April 17, 1997, Mr. Welker sent a letter to the chiropractic clinic
acknowledging that he had an "outstanding tbalance" in the Crowley, Welker, and
3ouapha matters.

Mr. Welker stated in the letter that he had. paid a portion of the ,

outstanding balance and offered to make further monthly payments of the funds.
20. On April 15, 1998, the chiropractic clinic sent another letter to Mr. Welker
egarding Ms. Crowley's and Ms. Welker's matters.
21. Prior to January 20, 2000, Mr. Welker paid all money due on the Crowley and
Velker accounts at the chiropractic clinic. The Bouapha account was paid previous to
anuary2000.
22.

Mr. Welker did not receive any additional funds in the three client matters

ther than the funds due him for his fees and costs. Any funds that were to be paid
ver to the chiropractic clinic were paid over to the clients. At no time did the
hiropractic clinic seek repayment from the three clients.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
23. In Mr. Welker's representation of Ms. Crowley, Ms. Welker, and Ms. Bouapha,
Mr. Welker he failed promptly to notify the third person and failed promptly to deliver to
the third person funds or other property that the third person was entitled to receive in
violation of Rule 1.15(b) (Safekeeping Property) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
24. In Mr. Welker's representation of Ms. Crowley, Ms. Welker, and Ms.
Bouapha, Mr. Welker failed to keep complete records of third party funds and other
property kept by Mr! Welker and failed to preserve for a period of five years after
termination of the representation those records, in violation of Rule 1.15(a)
(Safekeeping Property) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
ORDER OF SUSPENSION
" • IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of Lawyer Discipline ;
and Disability, Mr. Welker is hereby suspended frorri the practice of law for thirty days.
The effective date of that thirty (30) day suspension shall be the date that the Court has
signed this Order. Mr. Welker will be enjoined and prohibited from practicing law in the
State of Utah, holding himself out as an attorney at law, performing any legal services
for others, giving legal advice to others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for
rendering legal services as an attorney, appearing as counsel or in any representative
capacity in any proceeding in any Utah court or before any Utah administrative body as
an attorney (whether state, county, municipal, or other), or holding himself out to others
or using her name in any manner in conjunction with the words "Attorney at Law",
"Counselor at Law", or "Lawyer"

Z.'\WELKERtFnm.9lM.
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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Welker shall comply with all
requirements of Rules 24 Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.

Mr. Welker shall

file with the Court and serve on the OPC an affidavit showing compliance with the terms
of this Order as required by Rule 24. Currently, Mr. Welker is on inactive status with the
Utah State Bar, and if he wishes to practice law in the State of Utah he must obtain
active status as well as file the affidavit as required by Rule 24 to be fully reinstated to
the practice of law in the State of Utah.
IT ISiHiREBY FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will retain jurisdiction in this
matter.

DATED this

7 7<<k^

/ i ^ d a v of

BYTHEeOORT:

Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge

approved as to form

S'
M
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elbert Welker, Respondent
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ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public,
IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without
prejudice, and:
Q

K

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED
to the Supreme Court.

The stipulated facte' and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, *
and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

f*e

cOtoAJl'Mc^c^x-s.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or
modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this
court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of
Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme
Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 953(a), California Rules of
Court.)

of the State Bar Court
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IN THE MATTER OF HARRY D. WELKER
Case Numbers 99-0-12194; 99-O-12580; Ol-J-02752
COURT'S MODIFICATIONS TO STIPULATED FACTS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
1.

In the caption on page 1, an "x" shall be inserted in the box indicating that the stipulation
is submitted to the assigned judge.

2.

Under the conclusiQns of law in CaseNo* 99-0-12194, thethird full paragraph on page
:I2statii^'^
violation of rule 4-100(B)(4)," shall be deleted. The stated facts support a violation of
section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code, which is also set forth in the
Stipulation.

3.

On page 13, under "Multiple Acts/Pattern of Misconduct" as a factor in aggravation,
while there is clear and convincing evidence of multiple acts of misconduct, the facts do
. not support a pattern of misconduct. (See, In the Matter of Crane arid DePew (Review
Dept. 1990)1 Cat State Bar CtRptr, 139,157.)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc; Code Civ. Proc, § 1013a(4)l

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to
the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco,
on September 4,2001,1 deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
[X]

by first-classinail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

HARRY D.WELKER
8661 S HIGHLAND DR #179
SANDY
UT 84093

[X]

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:
SHERRIE MCLETCHIE , Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on
September 4,2001.

LaineSilber
Case Administrator
State Bar Court
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The document to which this certificate is affixed is a
full, true and correct copy of the original on file and of
record in the State Bar Court.
ATTEST

June 4, 2002
State Bar Court, State Bar of California,
Los Angeles

OirXf/lafffi"

By
Clerk
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Third Judicial District

APR2 3 2003
Paul H. Proctor, #2657
^V*%$fyQ
Assistant Counsel
*
^F^J^j
,D
Utah State Bar
*putycieric
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

]I
]|

ORDER OF RECIPROCAL
DISCIPLINE

]i

Civil No. 020909349

H. DelbertWelker,#3418
Respondent.

i

Judge Robin W. Reese

On March 14,2002 a hearing was held upon the Office of Professional Conduct's
Petition for Reciprocal Discipline under Rule 22 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability. Paul H. Proctor appeared and argued on behalf of the Office of Professional
Conduct. Respondent H. Delbert Welker appeared and argued on his own behalf.
Having read the Petition and Brief in Support of Discipline, and Respondent's
Answer to the Petition, Memorandum and Affidavit in response to the Petition and
Memorandum and Affidavit in reply to the Brief, having heard the arguments, and
having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

H. Delbert Welker, Utah State/Bar No. 3418 is suspended from the

practice of law in the state of Utah for one/year effective March 28, 2003. Except as
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provided in Paragraph 2 of this Order, he shall not from and after March 28, 2003,
practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person licensed or
qualified to practice law or to carry on the calling of an attorney at law in Utah.
2.

With respect to a personal injury matter, an auto/pedestrian accident, in

which Welker represents a minor, he may continue with this representation by filing for a
conservatorship necessary to conclude the personal injury claim of the minor. Should
the case not be concluded within 30 days of March 28, 2003, Welker is directed to
report the status of the case to this Court and provide a date by which it is believed the
matter can be concluded.
3.

All other terms and conditions of discipline imposed by the California

Supreme Court In Re Harry Delbert Welker On Discipline, Case No. S101662 arising
from the State Bar Court, State Bar of California, In the Matter of Harry Delbert Welker,
State Bar No. 156867, Case Nos. 99-0-12194; 99-0-12580; and 01-J-02752 are
imposed herein.
3.

H. Delbert Welker may be reinstated to the practice of law in Utah in

accordance with Rule 26(j) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
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4.

No costs or attorneys fees are awarded.

DATED this £ * " day of April 2003
BY THE COURT:

/"7
V

=4

\r

;LU

Robin W. Reese
District Judge
Approved at to form:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

of October, 2003, I caused to be
I hereby certify that on this 9°
HO day
day of
mailed via United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Respondent/Appellee, H. Delbert Welker, 8661
South Highland Drive, #179, Sandy, UT 84093.
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